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Economic policy dilemmas in Latin America: evidence for Argentina, Brazil and Chile

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Listed:
  • Lopez-Pablos, Rodrigo

    (Universidad Nacional de La Matanza)

Abstract

By introducing elements of phenomenological philosophy to the analysis of human needs in economics; from Sartrean postulates as well as the nature and essence of individual’s needs, has been revealed a theorethical framework that serves to ponder human being’s existential behavior by means of their phenomenologic social choices and welfare. Defining a planning agent under strong assumptions of rationality and projective efficacious capabilities, the Arrow’s theorem has been proved for the economic agent aware of its finitude in this world.

Suggested Citation

  • Lopez-Pablos, Rodrigo, 2013. "Economic policy dilemmas in Latin America: evidence for Argentina, Brazil and Chile," Revista de Economía Política de Buenos Aires, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política IIEP (UBA-CONICET), issue 12, pages 105-135, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ake:repba1:y:2013:i:12:p:105-135
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sen, Amartya, 1985. "A Sociological Approach to the Measurement of Poverty: A Reply [Poor, Relatively Speaking]," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(4), pages 669-676, December.
    2. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
    • D69 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Other
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
    • O20 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General

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