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Fmha'S Efforts Against Delinquent Borrowers: Property Interests And Transaction Costs

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  • Centner, Terence J.
  • White, Fred C.

Abstract

A recent judicial decision has precluded the Farmers Home Administration from employing nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings in some states. Characteristics of FmHA loans and borrowers suggest that a potential "hold up" problem exists whereby borrowers may cause the value of their mortgaged properties to diminish below the outstanding balance of the loan. Empirical results of a survey show that the preclusion of nonjudicial foreclosure increased FmHA's direct losses from delinquent borrowers.

Suggested Citation

  • Centner, Terence J. & White, Fred C., 1987. "Fmha'S Efforts Against Delinquent Borrowers: Property Interests And Transaction Costs," Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 12(01), pages 1-7, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:wjagec:32472
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.32472
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Carlisle Ford Runge, 1984. "Strategic Interdependence in Models of Property Rights," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 66(5), pages 807-813.
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