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Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Tørsløv
  • Ludvig Wier
  • Gabriel Zucman

Abstract

We show that the fiscal authorities of high-tax countries can lack the incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. Instead, they have incentives to focus their enforcement efforts on relocating profits booked by multinationals in other high-tax countries, crowding out the enforcement on transactions that shift profits to tax havens, and reducing the global tax payments of multinational companies. The predictions of our model are motivated and supported by the analysis of two new datasets: the universe of transfer price corrections conducted by the Danish tax authority, and new cross-country data on international tax enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Tørsløv & Ludvig Wier & Gabriel Zucman, 2023. "Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 497-525, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:15:y:2023:i:2:p:497-525
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200200
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Petr Procházka, 2021. "Critical Literature Review on Tax Avoidance," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2021(2), pages 245-250.
    2. Garcia-Bernardo, Javier & Janský, Petr, 2024. "Profit shifting of multinational corporations worldwide," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    3. Petr Procházka, . "Critical Literature Review on Tax Avoidance," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 0.
    4. Franz Reiter & Dominika Langenmayr & Svea Holtmann, 2021. "Avoiding taxes: banks’ use of internal debt," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(3), pages 717-745, June.
    5. Mr. Shafik Hebous & Mr. Alexander D Klemm & Yuou Wu, 2021. "How Does Profit Shifting Affect the Balance of Payments?," IMF Working Papers 2021/041, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Margarita Lopez Forero & Benjamin Michallet, 2024. "Employment Effects of a Weakening in European Anti-Tax Avoidance Rules: evidence from France," Working Papers 021, EU Tax Observatory.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law

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