Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game
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- Cantore, C. M. & Levine, P. & Melina, G. & Pearlman, J., 2013. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Rules in Normal and Abnormal Times," Working Papers 13/16, Department of Economics, City University London.
References listed on IDEAS
- Fr Chette, Guillaume R. & Kagel, John H. & Lehrer, Steven F., 2003.
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- Guillaume R. Frechette & John H. Kagel & Steven Lehrer, 2000. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1515, Econometric Society.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002.
"Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game,"
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- Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 1998. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Working Papers 1036, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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- Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2012. "Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(04), pages 908-909, November.
- Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas, 2011. "Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2011-205, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Vespa, Emanuel I., 2016. "Malapportionment and multilateral bargaining: An experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 64-74.
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:60-92 is not listed on IDEAS
- Agranov, Marina & Fréchette, Guillaume & Palfrey, Thomas & Vespa, Emanuel, 2016. "Static and dynamic underinvestment: An experimental investigation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 125-141.
- Christiansen, Nels, 2015. "Greasing the wheels: Pork and public goods contributions in a legislative bargaining experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 64-79.
- Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2017. "Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results," Working Papers 1065, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- repec:spr:jesaex:v:3:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s40881-017-0038-x is not listed on IDEAS
- Miller, Luis & Montero, Maria & Vanberg, Christoph, 2018.
"Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 60-92.
- Luis Miller & Maria Montero & Christoph Vanberg, 2015. "Legislative Bargaining with Heterogeneous Disagreement Values: Theory and Experiments," Discussion Papers 2015-24, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
More about this item
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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