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Le modèle WS-PS


  • Pierre Cahuc
  • André Zylberberg


This paper offers a dynamic model of the labor market with collective wage bargaining in a small open economy. The long run and short run equilibria are carefully distinguished, and the dynamics of the unemployment rate is analyzed. This model is useful to study the consequences of shocks on the fiscal wedge, the unemployment benefits, the cost of capital and other variables such as the growth rate of the labor force.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 1999. "Le modèle WS-PS," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 53, pages 1-30.
  • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1999:i:53:p:1-30

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Paul Belleflamme & Jean Hindriks, 2005. "Yardstick competition and political agency problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 155-169, September.
    2. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
    3. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
    4. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
    5. Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2004. "Economic integration and political accountability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1001-1025, October.
    6. Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2002. "Local public goods, inter-regional transfers and private information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 329-356, February.
    7. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    8. McMillan, John, 1979. "Individual incentives in the supply of public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-98, August.
    9. Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2007. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 755-773, April.
    10. Revelli, Federico, 2006. "Performance rating and yardstick competition in social service provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 459-475, February.
    11. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
    12. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
    13. Chen Kong-Pin, 1995. "On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium under Imperfect Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 600-610, April.
    14. Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April.
    15. Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Local Public Goods, Risk Sharing, and Private Information in Federal Systems," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 39-60, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Van der Linden, Bruno, 1998. "Fighting unemployment without worsening povety: Basic income versus reductions of social security contributions," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1999028, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 00 Oct 1999.
    2. Yannick L'horty & Christophe Rault, 2003. "Why Is French Equilibrium Unemployment So High?," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 6, pages 127-156, May.
    3. Olivier Bontout & Sébastien Jean, 1998. "Wages and Unemployment: Trade-off Under Different Labour Market Paradigms," Working Papers 1998-13, CEPII research center.
    4. Cahuc, Pierre & Gianella, Christian & Goux, Dominique & Zylberberg, Andre, 2002. "Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining Power: Evidence from a Panel of French Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 3510, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Garloff, Alfred, 2003. "Lohndispersion und Arbeitslosigkeit: Neuere Ansätze in der Suchtheorie," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-60, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Van der Linden, Bruno, 1999. "Active Citizen's Income, Unconditional Income and Participation under Imperfect Competition: A Normative Analysis," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1999023, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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