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Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Fandel, G. & Trockel, J., 2013. "Avoiding non-optimal management decisions by applying a three-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 226(1), pages 85-93.
  2. Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Tempting righteous citizens? Counterintuitive effects of increasing sanctions in the realm of organized crime," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 37-40.
  3. A. Antoci & S. Borghesi & G. Iannucci, 2016. "Green licenses and environmental corruption: a random matching model," Working Paper CRENoS 201615, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  4. Pradiptyo Rimawan, 2007. "Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 197-219, August.
  5. Zhiyong (John) Liu & Zhewei Wang & Zhendong Yin, 2022. "When is duplication of effort a good thing in law enforcement?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(4), pages 682-708, August.
  6. Dominic Spengler, 2012. "Endogenising Detection in an Asymmetric Penalties Corruption Game," Discussion Papers 12/20, Department of Economics, University of York.
  7. Daniel G. Arce, 2018. "On the cooperative and competitive aspects of strategic monitoring," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(3), pages 377-390, August.
  8. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Buechel, Berno & Emrich, Eike & Pohlkamp, Stefanie, 2013. "Nobody's innocent: the role of customers in the doping dilemma," MPRA Paper 44627, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Gianfranco Gambarelli & Daniele Gervasio & Francesca Maggioni & Daniel Faccini, 2022. "A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 295-307, June.
  11. Luciano Andreozzi, 2008. "Inspection games with long-run inspectors," Department of Economics Working Papers 0821, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  12. Rimawan Pradiptyo, 2015. "A Certain Uncertainty; Assessment of Court Decisions in Tackling Corruption in Indonesia," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: R N Ghosh & M A B Siddique (ed.), CORRUPTION, GOOD GOVERNANCE and ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Contemporary Analysis and Case Studies, chapter 10, pages 167-215, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  13. Manfred J. Holler & Barbara Klose-Ullmann, 2008. "Wallenstein’s Power Problem and Its Consequences," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(3), pages 197-218, December.
  14. Susumu Shikano & Michael F Stoffel & Markus Tepe, 2017. "Information accuracy in legislative oversight: Theoretical implications and experimental evidence," Rationality and Society, , vol. 29(2), pages 226-254, May.
  15. Anthony Rossiter & Susan M Hester, 2017. "Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 93(301), pages 277-301, June.
  16. Daniel G. Arce, 2007. "Is Agency Theory Self‐Activating?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 708-720, October.
  17. Guzmán, Cristóbal & Riffo, Javiera & Telha, Claudio & Van Vyve, Mathieu, 2022. "A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(2), pages 727-739.
  18. Arce, Daniel G., 2010. "Corporate virtue: Treatment of whistle blowers and the punishment of violators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 363-371, September.
  19. Guzman, Cristobal & Riffo, Javiera & Telha, Claudio & Van Vyve, Mathieu, 2021. "A Sequential Stackelberg Game for Dynamic Inspection Problems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. John Bone & Dominic Spengler, 2014. "Does Reporting Decrease Corruption?," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 26(1-2), pages 161-186, January.
  21. Spengler Dominic, 2014. "Endogenous Detection of Collaborative Crime: The Case of Corruption," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-17, July.
  22. Kirstein, Roland, 2005. "Bayesian Monitoring," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2005-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  23. Tim Friehe, 2008. "Correlated payoffs in the inspection game: some theory and an application to corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 127-143, October.
  24. Isztin, Péter, 2018. "Bűnök és büntetések - tanulságok a közgazdaságtani irodalomból [Crimes and punishments: Insights from economic literature]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 287-302.
  25. Bruni, Camilla & Nuño, Juan Carlos & Primicerio, Mario, 2013. "What if criminals optimize their choice? Optimal strategies to defend public goods," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(4), pages 840-850.
  26. Deutsch, Yael & Goldberg, Noam & Perlman, Yael, 2019. "Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an n-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 274(2), pages 627-637.
  27. Berno Buechel & Eike Emrich & Stefanie Pohlkamp, 2016. "Nobody’s Innocent," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(8), pages 767-789, December.
  28. Faria João Ricardo & Mixon Franklin G. & Upadhyaya Ashish & Upadhyaya Kamal P., 2019. "Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 1-30, July.
  29. Puneet Agarwal & Kyle Hunt & Shivasubramanian Srinivasan & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 208-226, September.
  30. Manfred J. Holler, 2013. "On Machiavelli’s conspiracy paradoxes," Chapters, in: Francisco Cabrillo & Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro (ed.), Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 7, pages 125-145, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  31. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series dp472, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  32. Miles Stan & Pyne Derek, 2017. "The Economics of Scams," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-18, March.
  33. Guy Elaad & Artyom Jelnov, 2018. "Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 375-387, October.
  34. James T. Bang & Atin Basuchoudhary & Aniruddha Mitra, 2021. "Validating Game-Theoretic Models of Terrorism: Insights from Machine Learning," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-20, June.
  35. Dong, Xiaoqing & Li, Chaolin & Li, Ji & Wang, Jia & Huang, Wantao, 2010. "A game-theoretic analysis of implementation of cleaner production policies in the Chinese electroplating industry," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 54(12), pages 1442-1448.
  36. Roland Kirstein, 2014. "Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(4), pages 385-409, August.
  37. Widodo, Erwin & Rochmadhan, Oryza Akbar & Lukmandono, & Januardi,, 2022. "Modeling Bayesian inspection game for non-performing loan problems," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 9(C).
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