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Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

Author

Listed:
  • Guy Elaad

    (Ariel University)

  • Artyom Jelnov

    (Ariel University)

Abstract

We analyze a game between three players: two Athletes and an Inspector. Two athletes compete with each other and both may cheat to increase their chances of victory. The Inspector wishes to detect incidents of cheating, and performs tests on athletes to detect cheating. The test is costly for the Inspector. Both probability of cheating and that of testing decrease as cost of inspection diminishes.

Suggested Citation

  • Guy Elaad & Artyom Jelnov, 2018. "Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 375-387, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:85:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-018-9669-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-018-9669-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inspection; Cheating; Doping; Contest;
    All these keywords.

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