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Citations for "On the robustness of equilibrium refinements"

by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K.

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  1. Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999. "Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Papers 9-99, Tel Aviv.
  2. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2004. "Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, David K. Levine.
  5. Carlsson, H. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine.
  7. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  8. Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 575-594, 09.
  9. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine.
  10. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July.
  11. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge," Discussion Papers 1324, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
  13. Suehiro, H., 1992. "A "mistaken theories" refinement," Discussion Paper 1992-24, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  14. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Marco Celentani, 1991. "Reputation With Deterministic Stage Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 636, UCLA Department of Economics.
  16. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 857-871, 05.
  17. Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997. "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 325-345, April.
  18. Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  19. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2005. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," MPRA Paper 14287, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  21. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, M. & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio, 1997. "Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 269-276, June.
  22. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium," Departmental Working Papers 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  23. Ken Binmore, . "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  24. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
  25. Kevin D. Cotter, 1987. "Convergence of Games With Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 709, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  26. Chen, Yi-Chun, 2012. "A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 587-597.
  27. Ken Binmore, . "Rationality and Backward Induction," ELSE working papers 047, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  28. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  29. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  30. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  31. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  32. repec:hrv:faseco:4729511 is not listed on IDEAS
  33. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
  34. Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets," Research Reports 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
  35. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1989. "Signaling and forward induction in a market entry context," Discussion Paper 1989-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  36. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
  37. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey," Discussion Papers 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  38. Klement, Alon, 2003. "Threats to sue and cost divisibility under asymmetric information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 261-272, September.
  39. Marco Celentani, 2001. "Essays on Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000176, David K. Levine.
  40. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).