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Citations for "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements"

by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine

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  1. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers ed504c985fc375cbe719b3f60, Penn Economics Department.
  2. Ken Binmore, . "Rationality and Backward Induction," ELSE working papers 047, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  3. Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 575-594, 09.
  4. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium," Departmental Working Papers 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  5. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Suehiro, H., 1992. "A "mistaken theories" refinement," Discussion Paper 1992-24, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  8. Marco Celentani, 1991. "Reputation With Deterministic Stage Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 636, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  10. repec:hrv:faseco:4729511 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.
  12. Daisuke Oyama & Olivier Tercieux, 2007. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000210, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge," Discussion Papers 1324, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  15. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  16. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
  17. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
  18. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  19. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey," Discussion Papers 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Kevin D. Cotter, 1987. "Convergence of Games With Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 709, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  21. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
  22. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  23. Ken Binmore, . "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  24. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  25. Klement, Alon, 2003. "Threats to sue and cost divisibility under asymmetric information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 261-272, September.
  26. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine.
  27. Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets," Research Reports 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
  28. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  29. Chen, Yi-Chun, 2012. "A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 587-597.
  30. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2004. "Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, David K. Levine.
  31. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  32. Marco Celentani, 2001. "Essays on Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000176, David K. Levine.
  33. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July.
  34. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, M. & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio, 1997. "Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 269-276, June.
  35. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  36. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  37. Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997. "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 325-345, April.
  38. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 857-871, 05.
  39. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
  40. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1989. "Signaling and forward induction in a market entry context," Discussion Paper 1989-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.