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Citations for "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements"

by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine

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  1. Carlsson, H. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 857-871, 05.
  3. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2004. "Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, David K. Levine.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.
  5. Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 575-594, 09.
  6. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
  7. Balkenborg, Dieter & Eyal Winter, 1995. "A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 331, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Klement, Alon, 2003. "Threats to sue and cost divisibility under asymmetric information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 261-272, September.
  9. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  10. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
  11. Daisuke Oyama & Olivier Tercieux, 2007. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000210, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Kevin D. Cotter, 1987. "Convergence of Games With Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 709, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Marco Celentani, 1991. "Reputation With Deterministic Stage Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 636, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  15. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine.
  16. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
  17. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1324, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  19. Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets," Research Reports, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
  20. Chen, Yi-Chun, 2012. "A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 587-597.
  21. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
  22. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium," Departmental Working Papers, McGill University, Department of Economics 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  23. D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
  24. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
  25. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July.
  26. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  27. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1989. "Signaling and forward induction in a market entry context," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1989-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  28. Marco Celentani, 2001. "Essays on Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000176, David K. Levine.
  29. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  30. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  31. Ken Binmore, . "Rationality and Backward Induction," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution 047, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  32. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  33. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  34. Ken Binmore, . "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  35. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1446, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  36. repec:hrv:faseco:4729511 is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  38. Suehiro, H., 1992. "A "mistaken theories" refinement," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1992-24, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  39. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, M. & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio, 1997. "Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 269-276, June.
  40. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.