Markets Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Markets Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism

Author Info

Ernst Fehr
Joseph Henrich

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. We provide ethnographic and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signaling and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity. The problem of these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, we conclude that alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW in its series IEW - Working Papers with number iewwp140.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:140

Contact details of provider:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Hanna Britt).

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-01-27 (All new papers)
NEP-CBE-2003-01-27 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
NEP-GTH-2003-01-27 (Game Theory)
NEP-LAM-2003-01-27 (Central & South America)
NEP-PKE-2003-01-27 (Post Keynesian Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity," Working Papers 2000-05, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 1998. "The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity," Research in Economics 98-08-073e, Santa Fe Institute. [Downloadable!]
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2001. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000143, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers iewwp010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions," IEW - Working Papers iewwp059, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Eric Alden Smith & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Costly Signaling and Cooperation," Working Papers 00-12-071, Santa Fe Institute.
Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2002. "Why Social Preferences Matter -- The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages C1-C33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Camerer, Colin F & Thaler, Richard H, 1995. "Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-19, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gächter, 2003. "Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms," Microeconomics 0305008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, . "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," IEW - Working Papers iewwp016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Simon Gaechter & Armin Falk, . "Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp019, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Gachter, Simon & Falk, Armin, 2002. " Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 104(1), pages 1-26. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, . "A Theory of Reciprocity," IEW - Working Papers iewwp006, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
- Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, 2001. "A Theory of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "A Theory of Reciprocity," CEPR Discussion Papers 3014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
Other versions:
- Lisa Cameron, 1995. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia," Working Papers 724, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS was sponsored from 1997 to 2002 by the Université du Québec à Montréal.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.