Public procurement in the presence of capital taxation
AbstractThe paper considers governments' public procurement decision as a way of influencing industry structure. In a federation in which capital is mobile and capital taxation is harmonized, a home bias in public procurement can potentially be explained as an effort to increase the capital intensity of local production and to attract taxable capital. As a result, governments may prefer domestic firms to more efficient foreign firms. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 99-41.
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
procurement; tax competition; federalism;
Other versions of this item:
- Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 2001. "Public procurement in the presence of capital taxation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 339-353, April.
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
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- Shingal, Anirudh, 2013. ""New" econometric evidence for the Baldwin-Richardson (1972)/Miyagiwa (1991) theoretical predictions in government procurement," MPRA Paper 49138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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