Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation
AbstractPrinciple-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample of 1,406 Belgian firms, we find, first, that managers holding no company shares under-invest into R&D compared to owners giving rise to the risk argument. Second, we find an inverse u-shaped relationship between the degree of managerial ownership and R&D. Thus, managers become entrenched, i.e. powerful enough to pursue their own interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects on their career, and hence tend to over-invest into innovation. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 11-026.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
corporate governance; managerial ownership; entrenchment; innovation; R&D investments;
Other versions of this item:
- Beyer, Mila Lou Paula & Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2011. "Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/305071, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Beyer, Mila Lou Paula & Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, K., 2013. "Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/320803, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-04-30 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-04-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2011-04-30 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-INO-2011-04-30 (Innovation)
- NEP-PPM-2011-04-30 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-TID-2011-04-30 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Holmstrom, Bengt, 1989. "Agency costs and innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 305-327, December.
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