Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Let them take gifts, and cheat those who seek influence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Graf Lambsdorff, Johann
  • Nell, Mathias
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Corrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism. Moreover, denunciation and extortion add another layer of uncertainty for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators can use an asymmetric design of criminal sanctions to amplify these inherent risks, thereby destabilizing corrupt arrangements. It is also shown that asymmetric penalties do not necessarily interfere with the goal of deterrence and that immunity may be a useful tool to disband the pact of silence characteristic of corrupt arrangements. --

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/55000/1/684264439.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics in its series Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe with number V-41-05.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v4105

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: 94030 Passau
    Phone: ++49 (0)851 509 0
    Fax: ++49 (0)851 509 1005
    Web page: http://www.wiwi.uni-passau.de/index.php?L=2
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Corruption; Asymmetric Sanctions; Destabilization; Opportunism; Denunciation; Immunity;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 221-241, July.
    2. Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2004. "The Use and Abuse of Trust: Social Capital and its Deployment by Early Modern Guilds," CESifo Working Paper Series 1302, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Renner, Elke, 2000. "The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 265-277, June.
    4. Kingston, Christopher, 2007. "Parochial corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 73-87, May.
    5. Johann Graf Lambsdorff & Sitki Utku Teksoz, 2002. "Corrupt Relational Contracting," Departmental Discussion Papers 113, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v4105. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.