Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery
AbstractIn major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery, one may wonder which punishment strategy is more effective in curbing corruption. For this purpose, we designed and ran a lab experiment in Bonn (Germany) and Shanghai (China) with exactly the same design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment recipients are less likely to grant the socially undesirable favor, while bribers are more likely to report to the authorities with asymmetric punishment. In addition, when punishment was asymmetric, corrupt offers were significantly more likely in Shanghai, but not in Bonn. Our results suggest a tradeoff between deterrence and law enforcement. In a forward-looking perspective, lawmakers must decide which aim carries more weight.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2012_01.
Date of creation: Jan 2012
Date of revision: May 2013
Bribery; Punishment; Effectiveness; Asymmetry; Legislation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2012-04-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2012-04-23 (Law & Economics)
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