Contracts induced by means of bribery: Should they be void or valid?
AbstractThis paper argues that contracts induced by means of bribery should be valid. Nullity and voidability decrease the incentive for voluntary disclosure, assist corrupt actors with enforcing their bribe agreements and provide leeway for abuse. Thus, they run counter to effective anti-corruption. It is argued that other instruments are more suitable for preventing corruption. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics in its series Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe with number V-53-07.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Bribery; Contracts; Corruption; Due Diligence; Enforcement; Impugnment; Liability; Leniency; Nullity; Private Law Validity; Voidability; Voluntary Disclosure (Program);
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kingston, Christopher, 2007. "Parochial corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 73-87, May.
- Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 221-241, July.
- Frédéric Boehm & Juanita Olaya, 2006. "Corruption In Public Contracting Auctions: The Role Of Transparency In Bidding Processes," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 431-452, December.
- Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008.
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
226, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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