Special interest groups and 4th best transport pricing
AbstractThis paper is organized as follows. In order to explain the basic idea of 4th best pricing more fully the following Section 2 will sketch and discuss the above mentioned Laffont model, where it is shown that under certain conditions a uniform tariff may be preferable to an optional tariff because such a uniform tariff is less amenable to the influence of interest groups. Section 3 will illustrate Laffont?s insight with several examples from the transport sector. Section 4 will conclude. --
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Transportation and Traffic Sciences "Friedrich List", Institute for Transport and Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1/2006.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Mommsenstraße 13, 01062 Dresden
Web page: http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/fakultaeten/vkw/iwv
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James Konow, 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1188-1239, December.
- Jens Schade & Bernhard Schlag, 2000. "Acceptability of Urban Transport Pricing," Research Reports 72, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
- Rothengatter, Werner, 2003. "How good is first best? Marginal cost and other pricing principles for user charging in transport," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 121-130, April.
- Gasmi, F. & Laffont, J. J. & Sharkey, W. W., 2000.
"Competition, universal service and telecommunications policy in developing countries,"
Information Economics and Policy,
Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 221-248, September.
- Gasmi, Farid & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Sharkey, William, 1999. "Competition, Universal Service and Telecommunications Policy in Developing Countries," IDEI Working Papers 92, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Theodore Keeler, 1984. "Theories of regulation and the deregulation movement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 103-145, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.