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Wettbewerb im Stromsektor der USA II: Re-Regulierung der Einzelhandelsebene im Bundesstaat Kalifornien

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  • Kumkar, Lars

Abstract

Gegenstand des Beitrages sind die Umstrukturierungen der Stromwirtschaft in Kalifornien. Im Gefolge der Entwicklungen auf der Bundesebene - dem Energy Policy Act von 1992 und der neueren Politik der Federal Energy Regulatory Commission - hat die kalifornische Regulierungskommission Maßnahmen zur Öffnung des Groß- und Einzelhandels mit Strom eingeleitet. Die Etablierung eines offenen Großhandelsmarktes und die Einführung eines Common Carrier-Modells im Bereich der Übertragungs- und Verteilungsnetze bieten Chancen dafür, daß die Stromversorgung stärker an Effizienzkriterien ausgerichtet wird. Erhofft wird eine Senkung der vergleichsweise hohen Strompreise in Kalifornien. Nach einer Analyse der bisherigen Struktur der Stromversorgung werden die einzelnen wettbewerblichen Reformschritte untersucht sowie Schlußfolgerungen zur weiteren Entwicklung der Stromwirtschaft in Kalifornien gezogen.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumkar, Lars, 1996. "Wettbewerb im Stromsektor der USA II: Re-Regulierung der Einzelhandelsebene im Bundesstaat Kalifornien," Kiel Working Papers 739, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:739
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kumkar, Lars, 1999. "Zur zukünftigen Regulierungspolitik für die deutsche Stromwirtschaft," Kiel Working Papers 929, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Kumkar, Lars, 2001. "Strommarktliberalisierung in Kalifornien: Schlägt das Pendel zurück?," Kiel Discussion Papers 378/379, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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