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The impact of regionalism on the multilateral trading order: French tariff bargaining in the Uruguay Round

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  • Piazolo, Daniel

Abstract

This paper analyzes the GATT negotiations during the Uruguay Round and shows that France was induced to accept a more free trade oriented package due to her integration into the European community. The importance of the European economic and diplomatic relationships led France to accept a GATT deal which she felt would be disadvantageous. Further, the paper investigates how this finding fits into the literature of the political economy of trade policy and how it can be incorporated into a game theoretic model of endogenous tariff making.

Suggested Citation

  • Piazolo, Daniel, 1995. "The impact of regionalism on the multilateral trading order: French tariff bargaining in the Uruguay Round," Kiel Working Papers 705, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:705
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1993. "Multilateral Tarriff Cooperation During the Formation of Regional Free Trade Areas," NBER Working Papers 4364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1993. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During The Formation Of Regional Trade Areas," SSRI Workshop Series 292700, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute.
    3. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1997. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(2), pages 291-319, May.
    4. Levy, Philip I, 1997. "A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 506-519, September.
    5. Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "What does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us That We Ought to Know?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1039, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521362474.
    7. Winters, L. Alan, 1994. "The EC and World Protectionism: Dimensions of the Political Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers 897, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Jeffrey J. Schott, 1994. "Uruguay Round: An Assessment," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 64, January.
    9. Panagariya, Arvind & Findlay, Ronald & DEC, 1994. "A political - economy analysis of free trade areas and customs unions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1261, The World Bank.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regionalism; Uruguay Round; European Union; Tariffs; Bargaining Model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration

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