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Ein funktionstüchtiges System privater Arbeitslosenversicherung

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  • Glismann, Hans H.
  • Schrader, Klaus

Abstract

Es wird untersucht, wie ein System privater Versicherungen gegen das Risiko der Arbeitslosigkeit beschaffen sein sollte. Zu dem Zweck wird ein Trennsystem vorgeschlagen, das Arbeitnehmern und Arbeitgebern gleichermaßen Anreize zur Verminderung von Arbeitslosigkeit gibt. Für die Arbeitnehmer wird ein Modell zur Bestimmung des individuellen Risikos und der darauf basierenden individuellen Prämien bei alternativen Leistungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung entworfen. Für die Seite der Arbeitgeber wird vorgeschlagen, die Vorteile des amerikanischen Systems des "Experience rating" wahrzunehmen und unter Ausnutzung von Rückkopplungseffekten auszubauen. Schließlich wird auf den Regulierungsbedarf in diesem hypothetischen System privater Arbeitslosenversicherung eingegangen.

Suggested Citation

  • Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2001. "Ein funktionstüchtiges System privater Arbeitslosenversicherung," Kiel Working Papers 1076, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1076
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    1. Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2003. "Zur Einführung privater Arbeitslosenversicherungen in Deutschland," Kiel Working Papers 1144, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Wolfgang Franz & Stefan Sell, 2002. "Reform of the Federal Labour Office: FLO - quo vadis?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 55(07), pages 03-09, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arbeitslosenversicherung; Arbeitslosigkeit; Versicherungsökonomik; moral hazard; adverse selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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