Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Global Governance of Global Monetary Relations: Rationale and Feasibility

Contents:

Author Info

  • Frieden, Jeffry A.

Abstract

Is there a valid argument for international cooperation, and some form of international governance structure, in the international monetary realm? On the purely economic front, the argument is not strong. Yet a broader political economy approach concludes that national currency policy can in fact impose non-pecuniary externalities on partner nations. This is especially the case with major policy-driven misalignments, which cannot easily be countered by other governments. For example, one country's substantially depreciated currency can provoke powerful protectionist pressures in its trading partners, so that exchange rate policy spills over into trade policy in potentially damaging ways. Inasmuch as one government's policies create these sorts of costs for other countries, and for the world economy as a whole, there is a case for global governance. This might include some institutionalized mechanism to monitor and publicize substantial currency misalignments. While there appears to be little global political attention to such a mechanism now, there have been initiatives along these lines at the regional level, and there are some early stirrings of interest more generally. --

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2008-32
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/27468/1/dp2008-32.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 2008-32.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7408

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel
Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 8814528
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics-ejournal.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Exchange rates; macroeconomic policy coordination;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rose, Andrew K, 1999. "One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2329, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. McKinnon, Ronald & Schnabl, Gunther, 2006. "Devaluing the dollar: A critical analysis of William Cline's case for a New Plaza Agreement," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 683-694, September.
  3. Lopez-Cordova, J. Ernesto & Meissner, Chris, 2000. "Exchange-Rate Regimes and International Trade: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard Era," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkele qt1b04r034, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Klein, Michael W. & Lewis, Karen K., 1993. "Learning about intervention target zones," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(3-4), pages 275-295, November.
  5. Mansfield, Edward D. & Milner, Helen V. & Rosendorff, B. Peter, 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(03), pages 477-513, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7408. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.