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Brauchen wir einen allgemeinen Kündigungsschutz?


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  • Jahn, Elke J.


Angesichts der seit mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten andauernden Massenarbeitslosigkeit ist das Kündigungsschutzrecht in den meisten kontinentaleuropäischen Ländern in den Mittelpunkt der Kontroverse um die Flexibilisierung der Arbeitsmärkte gerückt. Kritiker des Kündigungsschutzes behaupten, daß eine Deregulierung die Arbeitslosigkeit senkt, Befürworter heben dagegen die den Arbeitsplatzbestand schützenden Wirkungen hervor. Zunächst werden die Argumente der ökonomischen Theorie, die für und gegen einen staatlichen Kündigungsschutz sprechen, erläutert. Anschließend wird gezeigt, daß ein ökonomisch effizientes Kündigungsschutzrecht den Parteien einen Anreiz liefern muß, die Summe der Anpassungskosten und damit den bei einer Kündigung entstehenden Schaden zu minimieren. -- In view of persistent mass unemployment in most Continental European countries the employment protection legislation became the focal point of the controversy about labour market flexibility. According to the critics of the protection against unfair dismissal, deregulating employment protection legislation can lower unemployment. However, proponents emphasize that employment protection can maintain existing jobs. First of all, the paper investigates which arguments the economic theory has to offer for and against national protection against wrongful dismissal. It then goes on to show that an economically efficient employment protection legislation must create an incentive for both parties to minimize the sum of the adjustment costs and thus the damage following a redundancy.

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Paper provided by Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 9.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:faulre:9

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Keywords: Kündigungsschutz; Arbeitsrechtsreform;

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  1. Akerlof, George A, 1984. "Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 79-83, May.
  2. Levine, David I, 1991. "Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(3), pages 294-305, July.
  3. Miles, Thomas J, 2000. "Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and U.S. Labor Markets," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 74-101, April.
  4. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  5. Soltwedel, Rüdiger & Bothe, Adrian & Hoffmeyer, Martin & Laaser, Claus-Friedrich & Lammers, Konrad & Merz, Monika & Reuter, Dieter, 1990. "Regulierungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt der Bundesrepublik," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) 418, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  6. David H. Autor, 2000. "Outsourcing at Will: Unjust Dismissal Doctrine and the Growth of Temporary Help Employment," JCPR Working Papers, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research 153, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
  7. Lazear, Edward P, 1990. "Job Security Provisions and Employment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(3), pages 699-726, August.
  8. Bertola, Giuseppe, 1999. "Microeconomic perspectives on aggregate labor markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 45, pages 2985-3028 Elsevier.
  9. Frey, Bruno S., 1997. "On the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic work motivation1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 427-439, July.
  10. Greenwald, Bruce C, 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 325-47, July.
  11. Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1995. "Labor-Market Adjustments and the Persistence of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 219-25, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Eger, Thomas, 2003. "Opportunistic termination of employment contracts and legal protection against dismissal in Germany and the USA," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 381-403, December.


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