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Arbeitsrechtliche Schwellenwerte: Regelungen an der Schwelle zur Unüberschaubarkeit

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  • Koller, Lena
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    Abstract

    Im deutschen Arbeitsrecht gibt es eine Vielzahl arbeitsrechtlicher Schwellenwerte. Diese geben an, ab welcher Mitarbeiterzahl ein Gesetz bzw. eine Regelung wie z. B. der Kündigungsschutz zur Anwendung kommt. Wie in der Arbeit gezeigt wird, erschweren unterschiedliche Definitionen der Mitarbeiterzahl den Überblick über diese Regelungen. Eine Simulation unterschiedlicher Zusammensetzungen einer gegebenen Belegschaftsstärke macht deutlich, dass je nach Struktur der Belegschaft (Anzahl Teilzeitbeschäftigter, Auszubildender, Leiharbeiter usw.) unterschiedliche arbeitsrechtliche Schwellenwerte über- bzw. unterschritten werden können. Da die Überschreitung von Schwellenwerten meist zu zusätzlichen Kosten für die Arbeitgeber führt, wird oftmals vermutet, dass damit die Einstellung zusätzlicher Arbeitskräfte behindert wird. Ein Literaturüberblick zeigt, dass laut Betriebsbefragungen Schwellenwerte eine negative Wirkung auf das Beschäftigungswachstum haben. Ökonometrische Analysen können dies jedoch meist nicht bestätigen. -- German labour law contains a large number of thresholds. These indicate which number of employees in the establishment is needed so that the law or regulation comes into effect. The paper shows how different definitions of the term ?number of employees? can make it difficult for enterprises to understand these regulations. A simulation reveals that depending on the structure of employment (number of part-time workers, trainees, temporary workers etc.) an enterprise with a given number of employees may exceed different thresholds. Since crossing a threshold results in additional costs for the employer thresholds are supposed to hinder the engagement of new employees. A literature review shows that employer surveys find negative effects on employment growth, while in most cases this fact cannot be proved by econometric analyses.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 40.

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    Date of creation: 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:faulre:40

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    Web page: http://www.arbeitsmarkt.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/english-version/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Schwellenwerte; Beschäftigung; Deutschland;

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    References

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    1. Tito Boeri, 2004. "The Effects of Employment Protection: Learning from Variable Enforcement," 2004 Meeting Papers 445a, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Boockmann, Bernhard & Hagen, Tobias, 2001. "The use of flexible working contracts in West Germany: evidence from an establishment panel," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-33, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    3. Thomas Bauer & Uwe Sunde & Holger Bonin, 2004. "Dismissal Protection and Worker Flows in Small Establishments," RWI Discussion Papers 0012, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    4. Garibaldi, Pietro & Pacelli, Lia & Borgarello, Andrea, 2003. "Employment Protection Legislation and the Size of Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 787, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Fabiano Schivardi & Roberto Torrini, 2004. "Threshold effects and firm size: the case of firing costs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19956, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Tito Boeri & Juan F. Jimeno, . "The Effects of Employment Protection: Learning from Variable Enforcement," Working Papers 2003-12, FEDEA.
    7. Thorsten Schank & Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner, 2004. "Works councils - sand or grease in the operation of German firms?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 159-161.
    8. Verick, Sher, 2004. "Threshold Effects of Dismissal Protection Legislation in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 991, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Joachim Merz, 2005. "The Impact of German Job Protection Legislation on Job Creation in Small Establishments - An Application of the Regression Discontinuity Design," FFB-Discussionpaper 49, Research Institute on Professions (Forschungsinstitut Freie Berufe (FFB)), LEUPHANA University Lüneburg.
    10. Burgert, Derik, 2005. "The Impact of German Job Protection Legislation on Job Creation in Small Establishments - An Application of the Regression Discontinuity Design," MPRA Paper 5971, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Addison, John T & Schnabel, Claus & Wagner, Joachim, 2001. "Work Councils in Germany: Their Effects on Establishment Performance," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(4), pages 659-94, October.
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    Cited by:
    1. Bernhard Boockmann & Susanne Steffes, 2010. "Workers, Firms, or Institutions: What Determines Job Duration for Male Employees in Germany?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 64(1), pages 109-127, October.
    2. Burgert, Derik, 2006. "Einstellungschancen von Älteren – Wie wirkt der Schwellenwert im Kündigungsschutz?," MPRA Paper 5846, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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