The effects of rebate contracts on the health care system
AbstractGroup Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) increasingly gain in importance with respect to the supply of pharmaceutical products and frequently use multiple or exclusive rebate contracts to exercise market power. Based on a Hotelling model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine the controversy whether there exists a superior rebate scheme as far as consumer surplus, firms profits and total welfare are concerned. Accounting for horizontal and vertical differentiation, we find that firms clearly prefer multiple over exclusive rebate contracts. Contrary, there exists no rebate form that per se lowers total costs for the members of the GPOs or maximizes total welfare. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) in its series DICE Discussion Papers with number 45.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
GPOs; Rebate Contracts; Vertical Differentiation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-03-28 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HEA-2012-03-28 (Health Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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