The internalisation of external costs in transport: from the polluter pays to the cheapest cost avoider principle
AbstractThe European Commission mandated the consulting firm CE Delft to develop a framework for the internalisation of external costs and to devise a number of potential internalisation scenarios for further analysis. The results of their preliminary research are published in a CE discussion paper, and the Commission is now formulating draft legislative proposals which will be subjected to a consultation of stakeholders. The present report offers a critical assessment of the above mentioned CE study, providea a theoretical examination of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the polluter pays principle and the cheapest cost avoider principle in relation to the problems arising in the road transport sector, demonstrates how the cheapest cost avoider principle can be applied in practice by providing examples of external costs in road transport, and puts forward recommendations for the appropriate principles that should guide the Commission's further activities in this area. --
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2007-03.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Postfach 151150, 66041 Saarbrücken
Phone: *49(0)681-302 2132
Fax: *49(0)681-302 3591
Web page: http://www.uni-saarland.de/fak1/fr12/csle/
More information through EDIRC
Cheapest Cost Avoider; Externalities; Transport;
Other versions of this item:
- Dieter Schmidtchen & Christian Koboldt & Jenny Monheim & Birgit Will & Georg Haas, . "The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the Polluter Pays to the Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2008-1-1214, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wittman,Donald, 2006.
"Economic Foundations of Law and Organization,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521685245, April.
- Martin L. Weitzman, 2007. "A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 703-724, September.
- Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-95, September.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 2007.
"The Welfare State and the Forces of Globalization,"
NBER Working Papers
12946, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908, September.
- Louis Kaplow, 2002.
"Why Measure Inequality?,"
NBER Working Papers
9342, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jaffe, Judson & Schatzki, Todd & Stavins, Robert N., 2007.
"Too Good to Be True? An Examination of Three Economic Assesssments of California Climate Change Policy,"
- Robert Stavins & Judson Jaffe & Todd Schatzki, 2007. "Too Good to Be True? An Examination of Three Economic Assessments of California Climate Change Policy," NBER Working Papers 13587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stavins, Robert & Jaffe, Judson & Schatski, Todd, 2007. "Too Good to Be True? An Examination of Three Economic Assessments of California Climate Change Policy," Working Paper Series rwp07-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2009. "Least-Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of Common Safety," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 235-261, May.
- William D. Nordhaus, 2007. "A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 686-702, September.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1989. "Dikes, Dams, and Vicious Hogs: Entitlement and Efficiency in Tort Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 25-50, January.
- Enrico, Baffi, 2007. "The Problem of Internalisation of Social Costs and the Ideas of Ronald Coase," MPRA Paper 7277, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Baumol, William J, 1972. "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 307-22, June.
- Burrows, Paul, 1999. "Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 227-244, June.
- Schelling Thomas C., 2007. "Climate Change: The Uncertainties, the Certainties and What They Imply About Action," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 4(3), pages 1-5, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.