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The internalisation of external costs in transport: from the polluter pays to the cheapest cost avoider principle

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Author Info
Schmidtchen, Dieter
Koboldt, Christian
Monheim, Jenny
Will, Birgit E.
Haas, Georg
Abstract

The European Commission mandated the consulting firm CE Delft to develop a framework for the internalisation of external costs and to devise a number of potential internalisation scenarios for further analysis. The results of their preliminary research are published in a CE discussion paper, and the Commission is now formulating draft legislative proposals which will be subjected to a consultation of stakeholders. The present report offers a critical assessment of the above mentioned CE study, providea a theoretical examination of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the polluter pays principle and the cheapest cost avoider principle in relation to the problems arising in the road transport sector, demonstrates how the cheapest cost avoider principle can be applied in practice by providing examples of external costs in road transport, and puts forward recommendations for the appropriate principles that should guide the Commission's further activities in this area. --

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2007-03.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200703

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Related research
Keywords: Cheapest Cost Avoider; Externalities; Transport;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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