IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/bonedp/132000.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes

Author

Listed:
  • Gaube, Thomas

Abstract

Using the traditional model of voluntary public good provision, it is shown that an expansion of group size exacerbates free riding tendencies as long as private consumption and the public good are strictly normal and weak gross substitutes. This result generalizes a previous Cobb-Douglas example with respect to preferences and asymmetric equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaube, Thomas, 2000. "Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 13/2000, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:132000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/78425/1/bgse13_2000.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley & Todd Sandler, 1999. "Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 499-509, October.
    2. R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
    3. Lipford, Jody W, 1995. "Group Size and the Free-Rider Hypothesis: An Examination of New Evidence from Churches," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(3-4), pages 291-303, June.
    4. Martin McGuire, 1974. "Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 107-126, June.
    5. Bergstrom, Ted C. & Blume, Larry & Varian, Hal, 1992. "Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods : An improved proof," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 391-392, December.
    6. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185.
    7. Fries, Timothy L & Golding, Edward & Romano, Richard E, 1991. "Private Provision of Public Goods and the Failure of the Neutrality Property in Large Finite Economies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 147-157, February.
    8. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    9. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W., 1994. "Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-36, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Donna Harris & Benedikt Herrmann & Andreas Kontoleon, 2012. "When to Favour Your Own group? The Threats of Costly Punishments and In-group Favouritism," Economics Series Working Papers 628, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Donna Harris & Benedikt Herrmann & Andreas Kontoleon, 2009. "Two's Company, Three's a Group: The impact of group identity and group size on in-group favouritism," Environmental Economy and Policy Research Working Papers 41.2009, University of Cambridge, Department of Land Economics, revised 2009.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gaube, Thomas, 2001. "Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 127-132, January.
    2. Thomas Gaube, 2005. "Altruism and charitable giving in a fully replicated economy," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_8, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    3. Gaube, Thomas, 2006. "Altruism and charitable giving in a fully replicated economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1649-1667, September.
    4. Brunner, Eric & Sonstelie, Jon, 2003. "School finance reform and voluntary fiscal federalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2157-2185, September.
    5. Anja Brumme & Wolfgang Buchholz & Dirk Rübbelke, 2023. "The purity of impure public goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 493-514, June.
    6. Matthew J. Kotchen, 2006. "Green Markets and Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(4), pages 816-845, August.
    7. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2010. "Conflict of interest and coordination in public good provision," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 389-408.
    8. Kenichi Suzuki & Tatsuyoshi Miyakoshi & Jun‐ichi Itaya & Akitomo Yamanashi, 2022. "Existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a game of voluntary public good provision with two public goods," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 567-582, May.
    9. Thierry Pénard & Sylvain Dejean & Raphaël Suire, 2011. "Olson’s Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of Incentives to Contribute in P2P File-sharing Communities," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201105, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    10. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2001. "The overprovision anomaly of private public good supply," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 63-78, February.
    11. Fellner, Gerlinde & Lünser, Gabriele K., 2014. "Cooperation in local and global groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 364-373.
    12. Haan, Marco & Kooreman, Peter, 2002. "Free riding and the provision of candy bars," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 277-291, February.
    13. Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Sandler, Todd, 2023. "Politically influenced counterterrorism policy and welfare efficiency," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    14. Wang, Chengsi & Zudenkova, Galina, 2016. "Non-monotonic group-size effect in repeated provision of public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 116-128.
    15. Scharf, Kimberley & Smith, Sarah, 2016. "Relational altruism and giving in social groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 1-10.
    16. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2007. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 201-219, April.
    17. Paul Pecorino, 2015. "Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 243-262, March.
    18. Debasis Mondal, 2015. "Private provision of public good and immiserizing growth," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 29-49, June.
    19. Duncan, Brian, 2004. "A theory of impact philanthropy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 2159-2180, August.
    20. Josef Falkinger, 2004. "Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies," CESifo Working Paper Series 1368, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    private provision of public goods; group size;

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:132000. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/gsbonde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.