This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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• NEP-CBE-2005-01-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
• NEP-EVO-2005-01-16 (Evolutionary Economics)
• NEP-LAW-2005-01-16 (Law & Economics)
• NEP-PBE-2005-01-16 (Public Economics)
• NEP-REG-2005-01-16 (Regulation)

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1. Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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   • Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," IZA Discussion Papers 2288, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," Research Memoranda 029, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
   • Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," Discussion Papers 2006-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   • Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," IEW - Working Papers iewwp299, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
2. Francesca Bortolami & Luigi Mittone, 2009. "Does Participating in a Collective Decision Affect the Levels of Contributions Provided? An Experimental Investigation," CEEL Working Papers 0902, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
3. Alessandro Balestrino & Cinzia Ciardi, 2007. "Social Norms, Cognitive Dissonance and the Timing of Marriage," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Balestrino, Alessandro & Ciardi, Cinzia, 2008. "Social norms, cognitive dissonance and the timing of marriage," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2399-2410, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Alessandro Balestrino, 2007. "It is a Theft but not a Crime," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Balestrino, Alessandro, 2008. "It is a theft but not a crime," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 455-469, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)