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Strategies of Flexible Integration and Enlargement of the European Union: a Club-theoretical and Constitutional Economics Perspective

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  • Brandi, Clara
  • Wohlgemuth, Michael
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    Abstract

    Our paper proceeds as follows: As a point of departure, part two highlights the heterogeneity among EU member states following the recent enlargement, while part three reviews three main alternative conceptions of flexible integration as they were discussed in political circles. Part four applies Buchanan's and Tullock's Calculus of Consent (1962) to the tension between deepening and widening the EU. Part five introduces basic elements of the economic theory of clubs, analyzes the notion of the EU as a club and examines flexible integration in a club-theoretical framework. Part six considers several alternative integration models in view of the conclusions of both club theory and constitutional economics, while part seven focuses more specifically on a club-of-clubs approach that we tend to favour as an ideal-type model for a European Union of the future. Part eight evaluates the relative weaknesses and strengths of flexible integration according to the club-of-clubs approach and part nine advocates some further institutional recommendations before part ten concludes. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Walter Eucken Institut e.V. in its series Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics with number 06/7.

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    Date of creation: 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:aluord:067

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    1. Alesina, Alberto F & Angeloni, Ignazio & Etro, Federico, 2001. "The Political Economy of International Unions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3117, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, 2000. "A Proposal for a Flexible Europe," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(10), pages 1323-1334, October.
    3. Charles Blankart, 1994. "Club governments versus representative governments," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 273-285, September.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2001. "Institutional Rules for Federations," NBER Working Papers 8646, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Viktor Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, 1994. "Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 193-219, March.
    6. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John, 1997. " Club Theory: Thirty Years Later," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 335-55, December.
    7. Roland Vaubel, 1999. "Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 327-338, November.
    8. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
    9. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    10. Vanberg, Viktor J, 2000. "Functional Federalism: Communal or Individual Rights?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 363-86.
    11. Casella, Alessandra & Frey, Bruno, 1992. "Federalism and clubs : Towards an economic theory of overlapping political jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 639-646, April.
    12. Streit, Manfred E. & Voigt, Stefan, 1996. "Toward ever closer union--or ever larger? Or both? Entry to the European Union from the perspective of constitutional economics," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 385-388, September.
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    Cited by:
    1. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, 2013. "WTO 'à la carte' or WTO 'menu du jour'? Assessing the case for Plurilateral Agreements," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/58, European University Institute.

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