Ordnungspolitik, the Freiburg School and the reason of rules
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Walter Eucken Institut e.V. in its series Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics with number 14/01.
Date of creation: 2014
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-02-02 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lawrence H. White, 2010. "The Rule of Law or the Rule of Central Bankers?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 30(3), pages 451-463, Fall.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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