Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The global move into the zero interest rate and high debt trap

Contents:

Author Info

  • Schnabl, Gunther

Abstract

The paper identifies based on the monetary overinvestment (malinvestment) theories by Wicksell (1898), Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) monetary policy mistakes in large industrial countries issuing international currencies. It its argued that a benign neglect towards monetary policy reform in a world dominated by financial markets has led to a erosion of the allocation and signaling function of the interest rate, which has triggered an excessive rise of government debt and structural distortions in the world economy. The backlash of high government debt levels on monetary policy making is argued to lead to the hysteresis of low interest rates and high government debt levels. In this context, monetary reform is discussed with respect to the exit from low interest rates and high debt policies and a reform of the prevalent world monetary system. It is concluded that enhanced competition between dollar and euro as international currencies, which is refereed by East Asia, can be a promising approach towards a more stable world monetary system. --

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/77948/1/755550668.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science in its series Working Papers with number 121.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:leiwps:121

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Marschnerstraße 31, 04109 Leipzig
Web page: http://www.wifa.uni-leipzig.de/en/dekanat.html
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Economic Instability; Credit Cycles; Monetary Policy; Hayek; Mises; Monetary Policy Reform; Currency Competition;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Andreas Hoffmann & Gunther Schnabl, 2011. "National Monetary Policy, Internatinal Economic Instability and Feeback Effects - An Overinvestment View," Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series 19-2011, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  2. Mathilde Maurel & Gunther Schnabl, 2012. "Keynesian and Austrian Perspectives on Crisis, Shock Adjustment, Exchange Rate Regime and (Long-Term) Growth," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 847-868, November.
  3. Ronald McKinnon & Gunther Schnabl, 2009. "The Case for Stabilizing China's Exchange Rate: Setting the Stage for Fiscal Expansion," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 17(1), pages 1-32.
  4. Schnabl, Gunther & Wollmershäuser, Timo, 2013. "Fiscal Divergence and Current Account Imbalances in Europe," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79899, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  5. Axel Löffler & Gunther Schnabl & Franziska Schobert, 2013. "Limits of Monetary Policy Autonomy and Exchange Rate Flexibility by East Asian Central Banks," Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series 48-2013, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  6. Selgin, George & Lastrapes, William D. & White, Lawrence H., 2012. "Has the Fed been a failure?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 569-596.
  7. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  8. Andreas Hoffmann & Gunther Schnabl, 2009. "A Vicious Cycle of Manias, Crashes and Asymmetric Policy Responses - An Overinvestment View," CESifo Working Paper Series 2855, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Roger W. Garrison, 2004. "Overconsumption and Forced Saving in the Mises-Hayek Theory of the Business Cycle," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 323-349, Summer.
  10. Andreas Hoffmann & Gunther Schnabl, 2007. "Monetary Policy, Vagabonding Liquidity and Bursting Bubbles in New and Emerging Markets – An Overinvestment View," CESifo Working Paper Series 2100, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Lawrence H. White, 2010. "The Rule of Law or the Rule of Central Bankers?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 30(3), pages 451-463, Fall.
  12. George Selgin & Lawrence White, 2005. "Credible Currency: A Constitutional Perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 71-83, 01.
  13. Schnabl, Gunther & Freitag, Stephan, 2010. "Reverse causality in global current accounts," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 1208, European Central Bank.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Stop Preaching Emerging Countries, Blame Ben and VIX®
    by Shifting Wealth in ShiftingWealth on 2014-02-01 18:41:00

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:leiwps:121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.