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Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics

Author

Listed:
  • Albert Breton

    (Department of Economics - University of Toronto)

  • Gianluigi Galeotti

    (Facolta di Giurisprudenza, Universita di Roma I "La Sapienza" - UNIROMA - Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" = Sapienza University [Rome])

  • Pierre Salmon

    (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Ronald Wintrobe

    (UWO - University of Western Ontario)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Albert Breton & Gianluigi Galeotti & Pierre Salmon & Ronald Wintrobe, 2003. "Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics," Post-Print hal-00445584, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00445584
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Viktor Vanberg, 2007. "Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 199-222, September.
    2. Körner, Heiko, 2005. "Walter Eucken - Karl Schiller: Unterschiedliche Wege zur Ordnungspolitik," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 05/6, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    3. Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2005. "Politik und Emotionen: Emotionale Politikgrundlagen und Politiken indirekter Emotionssteuerung," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 05/9, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    4. Norman Frohlich & Joe A. Oppenheimer, 2007. "Justice Preferences and the Arrow Problem," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 363-390, October.
    5. Eith, Ulrich & Goldschmidt, Nils, 2005. "Zwischen Zustimmungsfähigkeit und und tatsächlicher Zustimmung: Kriterien für Reformpolitik aus ordnungsökonomischer und politikwissenschaftlicher Perspektive," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 05/1, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    6. Brandi, Clara & Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2006. "Strategies of Flexible Integration and Enlargement of the European Union: a Club-theoretical and Constitutional Economics Perspective," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/7, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    7. Blankart, Charles B., 2004. "Reform des föderalen Systems," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 04/14, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    8. Roger Congleton, 2012. "The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 131-146, July.
    9. Albert Breton, 2012. "Constitutional effectiveness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 397-401, September.
    10. Albert, Hans, 2004. "Wirtschaft, Politik und Freiheit: Das Freiburger Erbe," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 04/8, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    11. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2006. "On the Complementarity of Liberalism and Democracy," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/9, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    12. Schmidt, André, 2006. "Wie ökonomisch ist der "more economic approach"? Einige kritische Anmerkungen aus ordnungsökonomischer Sicht," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/10, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    13. Zintl, Reinhard, 2004. "Zur Reform des Verbändestaates," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 04/15, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    14. Roger Congleton, 2007. "On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 145-159, September.
    15. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Das Paradoxon der Marktwirtschaft: Die Verfassung des Marktes und das Problem der "sozialen Sicherheit"," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 05/5, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    16. Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2006. "Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft als Bedingungen für sozialen Fortschritt," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/1, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    17. Pelikan, Pavel, 2006. "Markets vs. Government when Rationality is Unequally Bounded: Some Consequences of Cognitive Inequalities for Theory and Policy," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/5, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    18. Pierre Salmon, 2017. "Is democracy exportable?," Working Papers halshs-01516493, HAL.

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