This paper sheds light on two mechanisms that make some citizens worse off from a political leader’s having access to more information. It also addresses the question who are the losers and who are the winners. Moreover, it is discussed how the results of the analysis can be helpful in understanding some normative and positive issues concerning interest group politics.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Geht es uns besser, wenn unsere Politiker wissen, wie die Wirtschaft funktioniert?) In diesem Beitrag werden zwei Mechanismen dargestellt, die dazu führen, daß Bürger schlechter gestellt werden, wenn ein Politiker Zugang zu mehr Information hat. Dabei wird auch auf die Frage eingegangen, wer die Verlierer und wer die Gewinner sind. Darüber hinaus wird erörtert, wie die Analyseergebnisse dazu beitragen können, einige normative und positive Aspekte der Vertretung von Interessengruppenpolitk zu verstehen.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) in its series CIG Working Papers with number
FS IV 98-07.
Length: 19 pages Date of creation: Aug 1998 Date of revision:
May 1999 Publication status: Published in the Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 106(1), 2004, pp. 123-142. Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv98-7
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