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Protests and Reputation

Author

Listed:
  • Buenrostro, Lucia
  • Dhillon, Amrita

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

  • Wooders, Myrna

Abstract

Protests take place for a variety of reasons. In this paper we focus on protests that have a well defined objective, that is in conflict with the objectives of the government. Hence the success or failure of a protest movement depends crucially on how the government responds. We assume that government types are private information so that governments have an interest in building a reputation to deter protestors. We extend the standard reputation framework to one where potential protesters in the domestic jurisdiction are competing in a common market with protestors of a foreign jurisdiction, resulting in a situation where domestic governments care about the decisions of foreign governments. We derive conditions under which an equilibrium with "contagion" in protests might exist : protests that start in one jurisdiction spread to others. Finally we use our results to interpret the Fuel tax protests in France and England that took place in 2000 as well as the three successive pro-democracy revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003-05.

Suggested Citation

  • Buenrostro, Lucia & Dhillon, Amrita & Wooders, Myrna, 2006. "Protests and Reputation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 751, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:751
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
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    7. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
    8. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roland Hodler & Dominic Rohner, 2012. "Electoral terms and terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 181-193, January.
    2. Mehdi Shadmehr & Peter Haschke, 2016. "Youth, Revolution, And Repression," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 778-793, April.
    3. Dawn Brancati & Adrián Lucardi, 2019. "Why Democracy Protests Do Not Diffuse," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(10), pages 2354-2389, November.
    4. Shadmehr, Mehdi, 2015. "Extremism in revolutionary movements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 97-121.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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