Asset Ownership and Investment Incentives Revisited
AbstractPrevious work on the property rights theory of the firm suggests that in the presence of outside options, asset ownership may demotivate managers. This paper shows that this conclusion relies on the assumption that a manager's outside option only depends on her own investment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 562.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
PROPERTY RIGHTS ; MANAGEMENT ; INVESTMENTS;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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