IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/12561.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Gender Differences in Alternating-Offer Bargaining: An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Iriberri, Nagore
  • Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo

Abstract

A laboratory study was carried out to analyze the relationship between ambiguity regarding the sharing norms in structured alternating-offer bargaining and gender differences in bargaining. Symmetric environments, where a 50:50 split emerges as the unique sensible norm, showed the lowest ambiguity and gender differences were absent. We increased ambiguity by introducing asymmetries into the bargaining environment by making one bargaining party get a higher share than the other (due to empowerment, entitlement or informational asymmetries), but without imposing new sharing norms. In these situations, men were less likely to reach an agreement, but, when they did, they obtained a larger share of the pie. As a result, men and women showed similar overall earnings but earnings were lower when bargaining with men. We found suggestive evidence that gender differences diminished when we reduced ambiguity regarding the sharing norms by providing information about other participants’ agreements in asymmetric environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Iriberri, Nagore & Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo, 2022. "Gender Differences in Alternating-Offer Bargaining: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 12561, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12561
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP12561
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christine L. Exley & Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, 2020. "Knowing When to Ask: The Cost of Leaning In," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(3), pages 816-854.
    2. Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, 2002. "Sex Differences and Statistical Stereotyping in Attitudes Toward Financial Risk," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-03, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    3. Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 890-907, Winter.
    4. Johannes Abeler & Armin Falk & Lorenz Goette & David Huffman, 2011. "Reference Points and Effort Provision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 470-492, April.
    5. Marcus Dittrich & Andreas Knabe & Kristina Leipold, 2014. "Gender Differences In Experimental Wage Negotiations," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(2), pages 862-873, April.
    6. Uri Gneezy & Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 1049-1074.
    7. Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, 2015. "Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(9), pages 2016-2024, September.
    8. Matthew Embrey & Guillaume R. Fréchette & Steven F. Lehrer, 2015. "Bargaining and Reputation: An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioural Types," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(2), pages 608-631.
    9. Säve-Söderbergh, Jenny, 2007. "Are Women Asking for Low Wages? Gender Differences in Wage Bargaining Strategies and Ensuing Bargaining Success," Working Paper Series 7/2007, Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
    10. A. Colin Cameron & Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, 2011. "Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 238-249, April.
    11. Ayres, Ian & Siegelman, Peter, 1995. "Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 304-321, June.
    12. Ben Greiner, 2015. "Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 114-125, July.
    13. Thompson, Samuel B., 2011. "Simple formulas for standard errors that cluster by both firm and time," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 1-10, January.
    14. Eckel, Catherine C & Grossman, Philip J, 2001. "Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 171-188, April.
    15. Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, 2005. "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 249-263, February.
    16. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
    17. Simon G�chter & Arno Riedl, "undated". "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining," IEW - Working Papers 113, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    18. Castillo, Marco & Petrie, Ragan & Torero, Maximo & Vesterlund, Lise, 2013. "Gender differences in bargaining outcomes: A field experiment on discrimination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 35-48.
    19. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 806-823, September.
    20. Ken Binmore & Avner Shared & John Sutton, 1989. "An Outside Option Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 753-770.
    21. Ma, Ching-To Albert & Manove, Michael, 1993. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1313-1339, November.
    22. Azmat, Ghazala & Petrongolo, Barbara, 2014. "Gender and the labor market: What have we learned from field and lab experiments?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 32-40.
    23. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    24. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
    25. repec:cup:judgdm:v:6:y:2011:i:8:p:771-781 is not listed on IDEAS
    26. David Card & Ana Rute Cardoso & Patrick Kline, 2016. "Bargaining, Sorting, and the Gender Wage Gap: Quantifying the Impact of Firms on the Relative Pay of Women," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(2), pages 633-686.
    27. Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, 2000. "Gender Differences in Pay," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 75-99, Fall.
    28. Sterbenz, Frederic P & Phillips, Owen R, 2001. "Bargaining Experiments with Deadlines and Random Delays," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 616-626, October.
    29. Paolo Crosetto & Ori Weisel & Fabian Winter, 2012. "A flexible z-Tree implementation of the Social Value Orientation Slider Measure (Murphy et al. 2011) - Manual -," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-062, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    30. Solnick, Sara J, 2001. "Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 189-200, April.
    31. Azmat, Ghazala & Petrongolo, Barbara, 2014. "Gender and the labor market: What have we learned from field and lab experiments?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 32-40.
    32. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dreber, Anna & Heikensten, Emma & Säve-Söderbergh, Jenny, 2022. "Why do women ask for less?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    2. Fröberg, Emelie & Säve-Söderbergh, Jenny & Wahlund, Richard & Wiley Wakeman, S., 2023. "The promise (and peril) in approaching gender parity: Preregistered survey experiments addressing gender inequality in negotiations," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    3. Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo & Iriberri, Nagore, 2018. "Women ask for less (only from men): Evidence from bargaining in the field," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 192-214.
    4. Demiral, Elif E. & Mollerstrom, Johanna, 2020. "The entitlement effect in the ultimatum game – does it even exist?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 341-352.
    5. Huang, Jennie & Low, Corinne, 2022. "The myth of the male negotiator: Gender’s effect on negotiation strategies and outcomes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 517-532.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz & Nagore Iriberri, 2023. "Gender differences in alternating-offer bargaining: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(4), pages 879-914, September.
    2. Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo & Iriberri, Nagore, 2018. "Women ask for less (only from men): Evidence from bargaining in the field," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 192-214.
    3. Christine L. Exley & Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, 2020. "Knowing When to Ask: The Cost of Leaning In," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(3), pages 816-854.
    4. Malik, Samreen & Mihm, Benedikt & Mihm, Maximilian & Timme, Florian, 2021. "Gender differences in bargaining with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    5. Iriberri, Nagore, 2016. "Women ask for less (only from men): Evidence from alternating-offer bargaining in the field," CEPR Discussion Papers 11514, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Anne‐Sophie Bruno & Nathalie Greenan & Jeremy Tanguy, 2021. "Does the Gender Mix Influence Collective Bargaining on Gender Equality? Evidence from France," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 479-520, October.
    7. Andrzej Baranski & D.J. da Cunha Batista Geraldes & Ada Kovaliukaite & James Tremewan, 2021. "Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining," Working Papers 2102, Utrecht School of Economics.
    8. Huang, Jennie & Low, Corinne, 2022. "The myth of the male negotiator: Gender’s effect on negotiation strategies and outcomes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 517-532.
    9. Demiral, Elif E. & Mollerstrom, Johanna, 2020. "The entitlement effect in the ultimatum game – does it even exist?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 341-352.
    10. Säve-Söderbergh, Jenny, 2019. "Gender gaps in salary negotiations: Salary requests and starting salaries in the field," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 35-51.
    11. Embrey, Matthew & Hyndman, Kyle & Riedl, Arno, 2021. "Bargaining with a residual claimant: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 335-354.
    12. SeEun Jung & Radu Vranceanu, 2017. "Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 33, pages 95-126.
    13. Shuwen Li & Xiangdong Qin & Daniel Houser, 2018. "Revisiting gender differences in ultimatum bargaining: experimental evidence from the US and China," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(2), pages 180-190, December.
    14. Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Kelly Shue, 2020. "The Gender Gap in Housing Returns," NBER Working Papers 26914, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    16. Veronika Grimm & Holger A Rau & Simeon Schächtele, 2020. "Gender differences in multi-employee gift exchange with self-reported contributions," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(9), pages 1-19, September.
    17. Estrella Gomez-Herrera & Frank Müller-Langer, 2019. "Is There a Gender Wage Gap in Online Labor Markets? Evidence from Over 250,000 Projects and 2.5 Million Wage Bill Proposals," CESifo Working Paper Series 7779, CESifo.
    18. Paul Goldsmith‐Pinkham & Kelly Shue, 2023. "The Gender Gap in Housing Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1097-1145, April.
    19. Feltovich, Nick, 2019. "Is earned bargaining power more fully exploited?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 152-180.
    20. Tobol, Yossef & Bar-El, Ronen & Arbel, Yuval & Azar, Ofer H., 2019. "Gender Differences in the Effect of Employee-Manager Friendships on Salary Dynamics in CPA Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 12707, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12561. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.