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Do Congressional Earmarks Increase Research Output at Universities?

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Author Info
A Abigail Payne (University of Illinois)

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Abstract

For twenty years universities have been able to bypass peer-reviewed research competition for federal funding and seek a direct appropriation of funding from Congress. Proponents of this earmarking claim that this funding helps the university build the infrastructure needed to be able to compete for peer-reviewed funding. Opponents claim this funding is used poorly and is less than productive than peer-reviewed funding. This paper attempts to answer this question by examining whether earmarked funding, when treated as a stock of capital, increases the number of academic articles published and/or the number of citations per article published. Using two panel data sets that span 1980 to 1998, incorporating university and year fixed effects, and using an instrumental variables estimation, this paper shows that while the number of articles published increase, the number of citations per article decrease. Depending on the data set used the annual increase in articles ranges, on average, between 8 and 14 percent. The annual decrease in citations per article ranges between 9 and 57 percent. If we concentrate only on earmarks for agriculture, earmarks that often are for small discrete projects, the results suggest the effect from an increase in earmarked funding is not statistically different from zero for both publications and citations per publication. These results suggest that earmarked funding may increase the quantity of publications but decreases the quality of the publications and the performance of earmarked funding is lower than that from using peer-reviewed funding.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0111002.

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Date of creation: 05 Nov 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0111002

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Related research
Keywords: congressional earmarking; research funding; universities;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 2002. "Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 9064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Hausman, Jerry A, 1978. "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1251-71, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. repec:bep:eapadv:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1018-1018 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Daghbashyan, Zara, 2009. "Do university units differ in the efficiency of resource utilization?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 176, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies. [Downloadable!]
  2. de Figueiredo, John & Silverman, Brian, 2004. "How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks," Working papers 4484-04, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  3. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 2007. "How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks," NBER Working Papers 13459, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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