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How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks

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Author Info
de Figueiredo, John
Silverman, Brian

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Abstract

This paper examines academic earmarks and its role in the funding of university research. It provides a summary and review of the evidence on the supply of earmarks by legislators. It then discusses the role of university lobbying for earmarks on the demand side. After a review of the literature of the impact of earmarks on research quantity and quality, the paper poses a number of public policy questions related to the funding of science.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7404
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management in its series Working papers with number 4484-04.

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Date of creation: 10 Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:7404

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Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Lobbying; Education; Political Economy;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
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  2. A Abigail Payne, 2001. "Do Congressional Earmarks Increase Research Output at Universities?," Public Economics 0111002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.

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