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Vernon Smith's Insomnia and the Dawn of Economics as Experimental Science

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  • Theodore C. Bergstrom

    (UCSB)

Abstract

This is a commentary on Vernon Smith's contributions to experimental economics

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/mic/papers/0212/0212001.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0212001.

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Date of creation: 28 Dec 2002
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0212001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on TeX; to print on HP ;
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: experimental economics; auctions; public goods; markets; Vernon Smith; ultimatum game; dictator games;

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References

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  1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
  2. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin A & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 289-301.
  3. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
  4. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Smith, Vernon L & Williams, Arlington W, 1981. "On Nonbinding Price Controls in a Competitive Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 467-74, June.
  6. Porter, David P & Smith, Vernon L, 1995. "Futures Contracting and Dividend Uncertainty in Experimental Asset Markets," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(4), pages 509-41, October.
  7. Vernon L. Smith, 1965. "Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 387.
  8. Miller, R. M. & Plott, Charles R. & Smith, Vernon L., . "Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium: An Empirical Study of Speculation," Working Papers 87, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R., . "Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination," Working Papers 253, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  11. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
  12. Banks, Jeffrey S & Plott, Charles R & Porter, David P, 1988. "An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 301-22, April.
  13. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1984. " Theory and Behavior of Multiple Unit Discriminative Auctions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(4), pages 983-1010, September.
  14. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1988. " Theory and Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 61-99, March.
  15. Bergstrom, Theodore & Simon, Carl P. & Titus, Charles J., 1983. "Counting Groves-Ledyard equilibria via degree theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 167-184, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Alessandro Innocenti, 2004. "Paradoxes versus formalism in economics. Evidence from the early years of game theory and experimental economics," Department of Economics University of Siena 433, Department of Economics, University of Siena.

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