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The Cause of the Great Inflation: Interactions between the Government and the Monetary Policymakers

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Author Info
Taiji Harashima (University of Tsukuba & Cabinet Office of Japan)

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Abstract

The paper offers a new explanation for the cause of the Great Inflation by constructing a model that explicitly separates the roles of government and monetary policymakers. A mechanism that inflation can accelerate even if an inflation target is low is uncovered. The model solves the puzzle of the observed high inflation target during the Great Inflation and indicates that the policy errors at the time were not solely attributed to the monetary policymakers but made in the process of interaction between the governments and the monetary policymakers. The model is consistent with the international aspect of the Great Inflation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Macroeconomics with number 0510026.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 31 Oct 2005
Date of revision: 31 Oct 2005
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0510026

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 35
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: The Great Inflation Inflation Persistence Monetary policy

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
N12 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Growth and Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lawrence J. Christiano & Christopher Gust, 2000. "The expectations trap hypothesis," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 21-39. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Mankiw, N Gregory, 2001. "The Inexorable and Mysterious Tradeoff between Inflation and Unemployment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(471), pages C45-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Richard Dennis, 2001. "The policy preferences of the U.S. Federal Reserve," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 2001-08, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. repec:cup:macdyn:v:5:y:2001:i:1:p:101-31 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Chari, V. V. & Christiano, Lawrence J. & Eichenbaum, Martin, 1998. "Expectation Traps and Discretion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 462-492, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Taiji Harashima, 2004. "The Ultimate Source of Inflation: A Microfoundation of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level," Macroeconomics 0409018, EconWPA, revised 23 Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
  8. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
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  9. Timothy Cogley & Thomas Sargent, . "Evolving Post-World War II U.S. Inflation Dynamics," Working Papers 2132872, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
  10. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2003. "The decline of activist stabilization policy: natural rate misperceptions, learning, and expectations," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 2003-24, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Athanasios Orphanides, 2002. "Monetary-Policy Rules and the Great Inflation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 115-120, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Gordon de Brouwer, 1998. "Estimating Output Gaps," RBA Research Discussion Papers rdp9809, Reserve Bank of Australia. [Downloadable!]
  13. Allan H. Meltzer, 2005. "Origins of the Great Inflation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 145-176. [Downloadable!]
  14. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 2000. "Monetary Policy Rules And Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence And Some Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 147-180, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Diebold, Francis X & Senhadji, Abdelhak S, 1996. "The Uncertain Unit Root in Real GNP: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1291-98, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2003. "The quest for prosperity without inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 633-663, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Harashima, Taiji, 2006. "The Sustainability of Budget Deficits in an Inflationary Economy," MPRA Paper 905, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Dec 2006. [Downloadable!]
  2. Harashima, Taiji, 2007. "Why should central banks be independent?," MPRA Paper 1838, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
  3. Harashima, Taiji, 2007. "The Optimal Quantity of Money Consistent with Positive Nominal Interest Rates," MPRA Paper 1839, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
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