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Evolution in Symmetric Incomplete Information Games

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Author Info

  • Erwin Amann

    (University of Duisburg-Essen)

  • Alex Possajennikov

    (University of Nottingham)

Abstract

The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric two-player games with incomplete information. One model postulates that the type of a player is fixed, and evolution works within types. In the other model type-contingent strategies evolve. In the case of two types and two strategies it is shown that the stability properties of stationary states are the same under the two dynamics when payoffs do not depend on the type of the other player, but may differ when they do.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0409/0409004.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0409004.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 06 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0409004

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: incomplete information games; evolution; stability;

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  1. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  2. Chamberland, Marc & Cressman, Ross, 2000. "An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 319-326, February.
  3. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, January.
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