Defining rules in cost spanning tree problems through the canonical form
AbstractWe define the canonical form of a cost spanning tree problem. The canonical form has the property that reducing the cost of any arc, the minimal cost of connecting agents to the source is also reduced. We argue that the canonical form is a relevant concept in this kind of problems and study a rule using it. This rule satisfies much more interesting properties than other rules in the literature. Furthermore we provide two characterizations. Finally, we present several approaches to this rule without using the canonical form.
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Date of creation: 12 Feb 2004
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cost spanning tree problems canonical form rules;
Other versions of this item:
- Juan J. Vidal-Puga & Gustavo Bergantiños, 2004. "Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through the Canonical Form," Working Papers 2004.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-02-15 (All new papers)
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