Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms
AbstractIn the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems, we present a bargaining mechanism for connecting all agents to the source and dividing the cost among them. The basic idea is very simple: we ask each agent the part of the cost he is willing to pay for an arc to be constructed. We prove that there exists a unique payoff allocation associated with the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this bargaining mechanism. Moreover, this payoff allocation coincides with the rule defined in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga [Bergantiños, G., Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2007a. A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 326-352].
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Operational Research.
Volume (Year): 201 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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