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Realizing efficient outcomes in cost spanning problems

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  • Gustavo Bergantiños

    (University of Vigo)

  • Juan Vidal-Puga

    (University of Vigo)

Abstract

We propose a simple non-cooperative mechanism of network formation in cost spanning tree problems. The only subgame equilibrium payoff is efficient. Moreover, we extend the result to the case of budget restrictions. The equilibrium payoff can them be easily adapted to the framework of Steiner trees.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0403/0403001.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0403001.

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Date of creation: 05 Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0403001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on WinXP; to print on HP;
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: efficiency; cost spanning tree problem; cost allocation; network formation; subgame perfect equilibrium; budget restrictions; Steiner trees;

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References

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  1. Mutuswami, Suresh & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2004. "Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 111-123, July.
  2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Kar, Anirban, 2002. "Cost Monotonicity, Consistency And Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 629, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo, 2003. "An implementation of the Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 412-427, August.
  4. Juan J. Vidal-Puga & Gustavo Bergantiños, 2004. "Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through the Canonical Form," Working Papers 2004.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. David P�rez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
  6. Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S.H. & Muto, S., 1994. "On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems," Discussion Paper 1994-106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  8. Kar, Anirban, 2002. "Axiomatization of the Shapley Value on Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 265-277, February.
  9. Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 389-407.
  10. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Implementation of the levels structure value," Game Theory and Information 0303006, EconWPA.
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