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Minimum Cost Arborescences

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Author Info
Dutta, Bhaskar (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)
Mishra, Debasis (Indian Statistical Institute)

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms representing incentive and fairness properties. We show that while some results are similar, there are also signifcant differences between the frameworks corresponding to symmetric and asymmetric cost matrices.

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File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/papers_2009/twerp_889.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 889.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:889

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Related research
Keywords: directed networks ; cost allocation ; core stability ; continuity ; cost monotonicity;

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  1. Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S. & Muto, S., 1994. "On the Irreducible Core and the Equal Remaining Obligations Rule of Minimum Cost Spanning Extension Problems," Discussion Paper 106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kar, Anirban, 2002. "Axiomatization of the Shapley Value on Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 265-277, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Norde, H. & Moretti, S. & Tijs, S., 2001. "Minimum cost spanning tree games and population monotonic allocation schemes," Discussion Paper 18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Kar, Anirban, 2004. "Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 223-248, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2007. "The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 223-239, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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