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No advantageous merging in minimum cost spanning tree problems

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  • Gomez-Rua, Maria
  • Vidal-Puga, Juan

Abstract

In the context of cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, we introduce a property called No Advantageous Merging. This property implies that no group of agents can be better off claiming to be a single node. We show that the sharing rule that assigns to each agent his own connection cost (the Bird rule) satisfies this property. Moreover, we provide a characterization of the Bird rule using No Advantageous Merging.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 601.

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Date of creation: 24 Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:601

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Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree problems; cost sharing; Bird rule; No Advantageous Merging;

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  1. Moretti, S. & Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Norde, H.W., 2005. "Cost Monotonic "Cost and Charge" Rules for Connection Situations," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2005-104, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Norde, H.W. & Moretti, S. & Tijs, S.H., 2001. "Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games and Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2001-18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Stefano Moretti & Rodica Branzei & Henk Norde & Stef Tijs, 2004. "The P-value for cost sharing in minimum," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(2_2), pages 47-61, 02.
  4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Kar, Anirban, 2002. "Cost Monotonicity, Consistency And Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 629, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Tijs, Stef & Branzei, Rodica & Moretti, Stefano & Norde, Henk, 2006. "Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 175(1), pages 121-134, November.
  6. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0504001, EconWPA.
  7. Sharkey, W.W., 1991. "Network Models in Economics," Papers, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group 69, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.
  8. Kar, Anirban, 2002. "Axiomatization of the Shapley Value on Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 265-277, February.
  9. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2007. "The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 223-239, October.
  10. Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S.H. & Muto, S., 1994. "On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1994-106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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