Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Spanning network games


Author Info

  • Daniel Granot

    (Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mail, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z2)

  • Michael Maschler

    (Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel)

Registered author(s):


    We study fundamental properties of monotone network enterprises which contain public vertices and have positive and negative costs on edges and vertices. Among the properties studied are the nonemptiness of the core, characterization of nonredundant core constraints, ease of computation of the core and the nucleolus, and cases of decomposition of the core and the nucleolus.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

    Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 467-500

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:4:p:467-500

    Note: Received December 1994/Final version March 1998
    Contact details of provider:
    Web page:

    Order Information:

    Related research

    Keywords: Games · cooperative games · networks · core · nucleolus · decomposition · minimum cost spanning tree games;


    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Bhaskar Dutta & Anirban Kar, 2002. "Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 02-04, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
    2. Kar, Anirban, 2002. "Axiomatization of the Shapley Value on Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 265-277, February.
    3. Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2001. "Operations research games: A survey," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-305110, Tilburg University.
    4. Martin Hoefer, 2013. "Strategic cooperation in cost sharing games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 29-53, February.
    5. Juan J. Vidal-Puga & Gustavo Bergantiños, 2004. "Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through the Canonical Form," Working Papers 2004.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Guillermo Owen, 2010. "Michael Maschler’s bibliography," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 301-308, March.
    7. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2009. "Additivity in minimum cost spanning tree problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 38-42, January.
    8. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Additivity in cost spanning tree problems," Game Theory and Information 0405001, EconWPA.


    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


    Access and download statistics


    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:4:p:467-500. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.