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The Efficiency of Adapting Aspiration Levels

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Author Info
M. Posch
A. Pichler
K. Sigmund

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Abstract

Win-stay, lose-shift strategies in repeated games are based on an aspiration level. Amove is repeated if and only if the outcome, in the previous round, was satisficing in the sense that the payoff was at least as high as the aspiration level. We investigate the conditions under which adaptive mechanisms acting on the aspiration level (selection, for instance, or learning) can lead to an efficient outcome; in other words, when can satisficing become optimising? Analytic results for 2 X 2-games are presented. They suggest that in a large variety of social interactions, self-centered rules (based uniquely on one's own payoff) cannot suffice.

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Paper provided by International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in its series Working Papers with number ir98103.

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Date of creation: Dec 1998
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Handle: RePEc:wop:iasawp:ir98103

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  1. Lutkepohl, Helmut, 1993. "The," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 729-43.
  2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  3. Martin Posch, 1997. "Cycling in a stochastic learning algorithm for normal form games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 193-207. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Marco Novarese & Salvatore Rizzello, 2003. "Satisfaction and Learning: an experimental game to measure happiness," Microeconomics 0306004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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