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Supply response of West African agricultural households

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  • Smith, Lisa C.
  • Chavas, Jean-Paul

Abstract

This paper explores the implications of preference heterogeneity between wives and husbands in nonresource-pooling rural West African households for the effect of crop price changes on agricultural production, i.e., their supply response. A "semi-cooperative" game-theoretic model of household decisionmaking, in which household members make unilateral time and income allocation decisions and negotiate over who controls these resources, is proposed. The model is used to show that Pareto efficiency in both production and consumption do not hold. It is then employed to simulate the supply response to cotton price increases accompanying agricultural sector liberalization in Burkina Faso in the early 1980s. The simulated semi-cooperative model predicts the cotton supply response of (monogamous) Burkinabé households to be 25 percent below that which would ensue in households facing the same production constraints yet whose members have identical preferences. The analysis indicates that in nonresource-pooling agricultural households, preference heterogeneity can be expected to mute supply response and may do so in a quantitatively significant manner. It illustrates how an intrahousehold approach that allows for such heterogeneity and for disaggregation of resource control by gender contributes to a better understanding of price effects.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in its series FCND discussion papers with number 69.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:fpr:fcnddp:69

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Related research

Keywords: Gender ; Resource management. ; Households Decision making. ; Household resource allocation ;

References

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  1. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  2. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
  3. von Braun, Joachim & Puetz, Detlev & Webb, Patrick, 1989. "Irrigation technology and commercialization of rice in the Gambia: effects on income and nutrition," Research reports 75, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  4. Haddad, Lawrence & Hoddinott, John & Alderman, Harold & DEC, 1994. "Intrahousehold resource allocation : an overview," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1255, The World Bank.
  5. Folbre, Nancy, 1984. "Household Production in the Philippines: A Non-neoclassical Approach," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 303-30, January.
  6. Hugo De Groote & Issiaka Dembélé, 1996. "Factors Influencing the Payments to Women in Malian Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1340-1345.
  7. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1993. "Sequential Labor Decisions under Uncertainty: An Estimable Household Model of West-African Farmers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1173-97, September.
  8. Lisa C. Smith & Jean-Paul Chavas, 1997. "Commercialization and the Balance of Women's Dual Roles in Non-Income-Pooling West African Households," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(2), pages 589-594.
  9. de Janvry, Alain & Fafchamps, Marcel & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 1991. "Peasant Household Behaviour with Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1400-417, November.
  10. Folbre, Nancy, 1986. "Hearts and spades: Paradigms of household economics," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 245-255, February.
  11. Safilios-Rothschild, Constantina, 1985. "The Persistence of Women's Invisibility in Agriculture: Theoretical and Policy Lessons from Lesotho and Sierra Leone," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 299-317, January.
  12. Doss, Cheryl R., 1996. "Testing among models of intrahousehold resource allocation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(10), pages 1597-1609, October.
  13. Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-46, October.
  14. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Hoddinott, John & Haddad, Lawrence, 1995. "Does Female Income Share Influence Household Expenditures? Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 57(1), pages 77-96, February.
  16. Haddad, Lawrence & Brown, Lynn R. & Richter, Andrea & Smith, Lisa, 1995. "The gender dimensions of economic adjustment policies: Potential interactions and evidence to date," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 881-896, June.
  17. Udry, Christopher & Hoddinott, John & Alderman, Harold & Haddad, Lawrence, 1995. "Gender differentials in farm productivity: implications for household efficiency and agricultural policy," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 407-423, October.
  18. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  19. Smith, Lisa C., 1998. "Macroeconomic Adjustment And The Balance Of Bargaining Power In Rural West African Households," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 20865, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Michael Kevane & Leslie Gray, 1999. "A Woman's Field Is Made At Night: Gendered Land Rights And Norms In Burkina Faso," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(3), pages 1-26.
  2. Jennifer Golan & Jann Lay, 2008. "More Coffee, More Cigarettes? Coffee Market Liberalisation, Gender, and Bargaining in Uganda," Kiel Working Papers 1402, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  3. Xu, Zeyu, 2007. "A survey on intra-household models and evidence," MPRA Paper 3763, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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