Estimating the endogenously determined intrahousehold balance of power and its impact on expenditure pattern : evidence from Nepal
AbstractThe collective approach to household behavior relaxes the restrictive features of the unitary model by specifying household welfare as a weighted combination of the individuals'utilities. But the weights are assumed fixed or exogenous to the analysis. The authors extend the collective approach by proposing and estimating a framework where the weights are determined and simultaneously estimated with the household outcomes. The authors present Nepalese evidence that suggests that a woman's share of household earnings understates her"power"in making household decisions. An increase in the woman's educational experience leads to a rise in her bargaining power. The results also reveal some interesting nonmonotonic relationships between a woman's"power"and the household's expenditure outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2814.
Date of creation: 31 Mar 2002
Date of revision:
Gender and Social Development; Housing&Human Habitats; Anthropology; Public Health Promotion; Economic Theory&Research; Poverty Lines; Health Monitoring&Evaluation; Housing&Human Habitats; Environmental Economics&Policies; Anthropology;
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