This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Inspections and emissions in India : puzzling survey evidence about industrial pollution

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Pargal, Sheoli
Mani, Muthukumara
Huq, Mainul
Abstract

Industrial plants face pressure to abate water pollution from many sources, national and local, through formal government regulation and through more informal pressure from consumer groups and concern for the firm's reputation. Formal regulation tends to reflect the bargaining power of local communities and is not as uniform or blind as the law would imply. Regulators are not immune to the pulls and pushes of powerful community interests. Studies of enforcement in the U.S. steel industry, for example, find that it is weaker at plants that are major employers in the local labor market. Using survey data from India, the authors examine whether the monitoring and enforcement efforts of provincial pollution control authorities are affected by local community characteristics (which serve as proxies for political power). They also test for evidence that informal pressure on plants results in negotiated reductions in emissions. They find that high levels of pollution in India elicit a formal regulatory response: inspections. But inspections are ineffective in bringing about changes in behavior, probably because of bureaucratic or other problems in follow-through. Moreover, poorly-paid inspectors with low morale may be susceptible to"rent-seeking."They find little evidence to support the hypothesis that better-educated and higher-income communities are better able to pressure plants to reduce emissions than are poorer communities, although there are significantly more inspections in more developed districts. In India, whatever community pressure exists is probably channeled through formal regulatory mechanisms. Larger plants in India, as in the rest of the world, tend to be"cleaner"than smaller plants. Indian policymakers and regulators may want to explicitly recognize the tradeoff in environmental quality of the existing regulatory bias toward the small- and medium-scale sector.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/02/24/000009265_3971104185027/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1810.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 31 Aug 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1810

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

Related research
Keywords: Sanitation and Sewerage Environmental Economics&Policies Water and Industry Water Conservation Public Health Promotion Water Conservation Environmental Economics&Policies Water and Industry Sanitation and Sewerage TF030632-DANISH CTF - FY05 (DAC PART COUNTRIES GNP PER CAPITA BELOW USD 2 500/AL

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gray, Wayne B. & Deily, Mary E., 1996. "Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 96-111, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Magat, Wesley A & Viscusi, W Kip, 1990. "Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 331-60, October.
  3. Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Harrison, Ann E., 1997. "Moving to greener pastures : multinationals and the pollution-haven hypothesis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1744, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dasgupta, Susmita & Wheeler, David, 1997. "Citizen complaints as environmental indicators : evidence from China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1704, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. James T. Hamilton, 1993. "Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 101-125, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Brooks, Nancy & Sethi, Rajiv, 1997. "The Distribution of Pollution: Community Characteristics and Exposure to Air Toxics," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 233-250, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dasgupta, Susmita & Huq, Minul & Wheeler, David & Chonghua Zhang, 1996. "Water pollution abatement by Chinese industry : cost estimates and policy implications," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1630, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Dion, Catherine & Lanoie, Paul & Laplante, Benoit, 1997. "Monitoring environmental standards : do local conditions matter?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1701, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-3.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.