Impact of Government-Sponsored Pollution Prevention Practices on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement: Evidence from a Sample of US Manufacturing Facilities
AbstractA two-way fixed effects Poisson model is used to investigate the impact of 43 EPA-sponsored pollution prevention (P2) practices on compliance and enforcement for a sample of facilities in the US manufacturing sector. I find that P2 adoption reduces environmental violations in three industries while increasing violations in two others. P2 adoption also spurs fewer enforcement actions in three industries. I further partition the P2 practices into three categories based on their approach to improve environmental performance. In doing so, I find that practices that involve changes in operating procedures--about a third of adopted P2 practices--such as instituting a self-inspection and monitoring program to discover spills or leak sources, improving maintenance scheduling and/or labeling procedures, are effective in reducing violations while practices that involve equipment or material changes are not. I also find that adopters of practices that require changes in either procedures or manufacturing equipment--about half of adopted practices--are rewarded with a more cooperative treatment of environmental infractions with fewer enforcement actions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its series 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin with number 49306.
Date of creation: 2009
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Pollution Prevention Act; P2 practices; compliance; enforcement; Poisson models; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q53; L51; C23;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P2 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies
- pra - - - - - -
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2009-05-16 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2009-05-16 (Regulation)
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